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PAYING THE PRICE: IT’S TIME TO HOLD 
MUNICIPALITIES LIABLE FOR PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
Gloria Jean Rottell* 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
recently held in Ciraolo v. New York (“Ciraolo”)1 that the City of 
New York was immune from an award of punitive damages in a 
§ 19832 action brought by a woman who was arrested for a 
misdemeanor and subjected to an unlawful strip search of her 
person.3 The city’s established policy of strip-searching all 
arrestees,4 regardless of whether there was a reasonable belief 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2002; B.A., Colby College, 1998. The 
author wishes to thank her family for their unconditional support and 
encouragement. She also wishes to thank Professor William E. Hellerstein of 
Brooklyn Law School for his helpful comments, suggestions, and discussions 
on earlier drafts of this note. 
 1 Ciraolo v. New York, 216 F.3d 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 
484 (2000). 
 2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Section 1983 was originally section 1 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13. See infra Part I.A (describing § 1983 
actions). 
 3 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242. 
 4 Id. at 237. In July 1996, the New York City Correction Department had 
adopted “guidelines [for] the acceptance of all Police Cases for the Manhattan 
Court Division, providing that [a]ll police prisoners received shall be strip 
search[ed] by the officer assigned to the search post.” Id. (alterations in 
original) (internal quotations omitted). In October 1996, the Executive Officer 
of the Manhattan Detention Complex implemented the guidelines by sending a 
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that the arrestee possessed contraband, was clearly 
unconstitutional in light of the established law of the Second 
Circuit.5 Despite the city’s disregard of the court’s prior decision, 
the Second Circuit reversed the award of punitive damages 
against the city6 based on the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. (“Fact 
Concerts”)7 holding that municipalities are immune from punitive 
damages under § 1983.8 
The result that the Second Circuit reached in Ciraolo,9 while 
in accordance with precedent established by the Supreme Court, 
is inconsistent with the policies and purposes underlying 
§ 1983.10 In fact, the holding in Ciraolo created such 
considerable cognitive dissonance in the mind of Judge Calabresi, 
who wrote the majority opinion, that he was compelled to also 
write a separate concurring opinion to express his concern that 
“the policies and purposes underlying § 1983 would be better 
furthered by a different outcome.”11 
                                                          
memo to all personnel ordering that, “[e]ffective immediately, all female 
police prisoners arriving at this facility. . . be strip searched.” Id. at 238 
(alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
 5 See Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that 
strip/body cavity searches of arrestees for misdemeanors or other minor 
offenses violate the Fourth Amendment unless the prison officials have a 
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee possesses contraband). 
 6 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 238. The district court had concluded that the city’s 
strip search policy violated the settled law of the Second Circuit, and, 
therefore, the city was liable for punitive damages. Id. The jury found that the 
city acted in “wanton disregard” of Ciraolo’s rights when she was strip-
searched, awarding her $5,000,000 in punitive damages in addition to 
compensatory damages of $19,645. Id. at 237. 
 7 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 
 8 Id. at 271. 
 9 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242. 
 10 See infra Parts I.B-C, Parts III.A-C. With regard to municipal liability, 
the policies and purposes of § 1983 have been of considerable consternation to 
the Supreme Court; this is evidenced by the on-going interpretation of the 
legislative history surrounding the enactment of § 1983, which has been 
thoroughly examined in the leading cases involving the scope of municipal 
liability. See infra note 55. 
 11 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242. 
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While municipalities are exempt from punitive damages under 
the holding of Fact Concerts,12 the Court did leave open, in 
footnote number twenty-nine (“footnote 29”), the possibility that 
punitive damages could be imposed on a municipality in “an 
extreme situation where the taxpayers are directly responsible for 
perpetrating an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights.”13 A 
number of courts have considered footnote 29;14 none have opted 
to uphold an award of punitive damages against a municipality.15 
Moreover, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court will find 
circumstances that warrant holding taxpayers directly responsible 
for municipal action.16 Consequently, lower courts have found 
footnote 29 to be poorly defined.17 Rather than rule counter to 
precedent, these courts have barred punitive damages against 
municipalities despite the exception provided for in footnote 29.18 
                                                          
 12 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 271. 
 13 Id. at 267 n.29. “It is perhaps possible to imagine an extreme situation 
where the taxpayers are directly responsible for perpetrating an outrageous 
abuse of constitutional rights. Nothing of that kind is presented by this case. 
Moreover, such an occurrence is sufficiently unlikely that we need not 
anticipate it here.” Id. 
 14 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 240 (finding that footnote 29, rather than being a 
general exception, provides an exception only for outrageous abuses for which 
the taxpayers are directly responsible); Webster v. Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 
1229 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that footnote 29 provides an exception only for 
particularly egregious violations of constitutional rights), rev’d on other 
grounds, 735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Heritage Homes of 
Attleboro, Inc. v. Seekonk Water Dist., 670 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1982) 
(concluding that the taxpayers were not directly responsible, under footnote 
29, because only a small number of taxpayers violated the constitutional rights 
of the housing developer). 
 15 See cases cited supra note 14. 
 16 The Supreme Court did not provide a test or an adequate means of 
assessing when the taxpayers would be directly responsible for municipal 
action. See Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29 (stating that a situation that 
would fall under this footnote was not before the Court and so unlikely that it 
required no further discussion). 
 17 See cases cited supra note 14. The three circuit courts that have 
analyzed footnote 29 have based their conclusions on different interpretations 
of the footnote. See supra note 14. 
 18 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242; Webster, 689 F.2d at 1229; Heritage Homes, 
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The absolute immunity from punitive damages that 
municipalities enjoy is detrimental to the protection of 
constitutional rights under § 1983 and fails to be meaningfully 
justified.19 To comport with the intent of § 1983, the Court 
should, at the very least, reconsider the scope of municipal 
immunity from punitive damages. Even under the most 
conservative reading of § 1983, a city that knowingly violates the 
clearly established law of its judicial circuit should be held liable 
for punitive damages. 
Part I of this note examines how the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the legislative history behind § 1983 municipal 
liability and the consequences of the “impenetrable barrier to 
punitive damages”20 established by the Court in Fact Concerts.21 
Part II analyzes the meaning of footnote 29, details the Fact 
Concerts decision, and then discusses the Court’s intent in 
creating an exception to municipal immunity from punitive 
damages.22 Part II also examines the policy reasons that support a 
more liberal reading of footnote 29. Through an analysis of case 
law,23 Part III of this note demonstrates how the precedent 
established in Fact Concerts has created unintended consequences 
for subsequent litigants. The section concludes that, while the 
Court correctly decided Fact Concerts, it erred in creating such a 
broad holding that threatens the intent of § 1983.24 As a means of 
upholding the purpose of § 1983, Part IV proposes two ways for 
the Supreme Court to rework footnote 29. Finally, Part V 
suggests that the rationale for the barrier to punitive damages, 
which supports the outcome in Fact Concerts, does not support 
                                                          
670 F.2d at 3. 
 19 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 250 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Webster, 689 
F.2d at 1237 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring) (arguing that in certain cases 
failure to impose punitive damages on municipalities undermines the policies 
of § 1983). 
 20 Webster, 689 F.2d at 1231 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring). 
 21 See discussion infra Parts I.B, Parts III.A-C. 
 22 See discussion infra Part II. 
 23 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 236; Webster, 689 F.2d at 1220; Heritage Homes, 
670 F.2d at 1. 
 24 See discussion infra Parts I.A-C, II, III.A-C. 
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the holdings of the subsequent cases.25  
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF § 1983 
A. An Overview 
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871,26 also known 
as the “Ku Klux Klan Act,”27 at the urging of President Grant.28 
The legislative intent behind the Act was to provide broad federal 
remedies to people who were deprived of their constitutional 
rights,29 in particular, their right to equal protection.30 While the 
                                                          
 25 Webster, 689 F.2d at 1231-32 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring). 
I am in agreement with the Supreme Court in Newport not only in 
regard to rationale and result, but also in regard to the Court’s overall 
approach to section 1983. What disturbs me is that the very 
methodology and rationale that dictate the result in Newport dictate a 
contrary result now. 
Id. 
 26 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 
 27 See S. Rep. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 
was commonly referred to as the Ku Klux Klan Act because it was enacted in 
response to the wave of Klan violence at the time. Id. 
 28 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871). On March 23, 1871, 
President Grant sent a message to Congress reading: 
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union 
rendering life and property insecure and the carrying of the mails and 
the collection of the revenue dangerous. The proof that such a 
condition of affairs exists in some localities is now before the Senate. 
That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of State 
authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the Executive of the 
United States, acting within the limits of existing laws, is sufficient 
for present emergencies is not clear. Therefore, I urgently 
recommend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall 
effectually secure life, liberty and property, and the enforcement of 
law in all parts of the United States. 
Id. 
 29 CONG. GLOBE, App. at 81. In the words of Representative Bingham, 
the author of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the purpose of the Act 
is to “enforc[e] . . . the Constitution on behalf of every individual citizen of 
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Klu Klux Klan had engaged in a reign of terror in the southern 
states,31 the state and local authorities either participated in the 
violence against the “loyal Republicans and freedmen”32 or did 
nothing to stop it from occurring.33 The Act was a legislative 
response to this failure of state and local governments to protect 
                                                          
the Republic . . . to the extent of the rights guaranteed to him by the 
Constitution.” Id. Furthermore, the remedial nature of the Act led to the 
sentiment of liberal construction. See GLOBE. App. at 68 (1 Story on 
Constitution, sec. 429). Even opponents of section 1 of the Act thought that it 
was to be far reaching. Monell, 436 U.S. at 686. Senator Thurman, who 
critiqued the Act found that “[there] is no limitation whatsoever upon the 
terms that are employed [in the bill], and they are as comprehensive as can be 
used .” CONG. GLOBE. App. at 217. See, e.g., CONG GLOBE. App. at 50, 
160, 179, 216 (citing comments made by Mr. Kerr of Indiana, Mr. Golladay 
of Tennessee, Mr. Voorhees of Indiana, and Senator Thurman of Ohio, 
respectfully opposing the Act because of the breadth of the remedy provided). 
 30 Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. The Civil Rights Act of 
1871 was passed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Id. It reads as follows: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding 
for redress. 
Id. 
 31 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing the inability of 
many Southern states to ensure enforcement of the law due to the Klu Klux 
Klan’s unbridled dominion of violence). 
 32 Ken Ballen, Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The 
Meaning of “Policy or Custom,” 79 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 308 (1979). 
33 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961). The Court wrote: 
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to 
afford a federal right in the federal courts, because by reason of 
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might 
not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, 
privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment 
might be denied by the state agencies. 
Id. 
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the constitutional rights of their citizens.34 Furthermore, the Act 
was to serve as a judicial remedy to citizens who were denied 
equal protection by their states.35 
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act, now codified as § 1983, 
passed with almost no legislative debate and without 
amendment.36 While other sections of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871 were being considered,37 Senator John Sherman of Ohio 
proposed an amendment38 to the Act (the “Sherman 
Amendment”) that would hold municipalities “liable to pay full 
compensation to the person or persons damnified [by certain acts 
of violence] if living, or to his widow or legal representative if 
dead.”39 Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment, however, 
because of its expansive view of municipal liability.40 While not 
intending to alter § 1983,41 the amendment is relevant in 
                                                          
 34 Id. at 176 (comments of Senator Osborn): 
That the State courts in the several States have been unable to enforce 
the criminal laws of their respective States or to suppress the 
disorders existing, and in fact that the preservation of life and 
property in many sections of the country is beyond the power of the 
State government, is a sufficient reason why Congress should, so far 
as they have authority under the Constitution, enact the laws 
necessary for the protection of citizens of the United States. 
Id. 
 35 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 459 (1871) (stating the remarks of 
Rep. Coburn). 
 36 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 522 (1871). 
 37 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180-81 (indicating that section 2 in particular 
created great controversy). 
 38 The Sherman Amendment, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 
(1871). 
 39 Id. 
 40 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) 
(indicating that the amendment was rejected by Congress because it imposed 
liability on municipalities for the wrongs of a few private citizens even if the 
municipality had “done everything in its power” to prevent the unlawful acts); 
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 264 (“It was generally understood that the extent 
of the proposed public liability went beyond what was contemplated under § 
1.”). 
 41 Monell, 436 U.S. at 666 (stating that the Sherman Amendment was to 
be added to the end of the bill as section 7). The Sherman Amendment was 
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considering the legislative intent regarding the constitutionality of 
congressionally imposed civil liability on municipalities.42 
According to Senator George Edmunds, who was then Senate 
Manager of the Act and Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, municipalities are bound by the duty of protection 
that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on states.43 While 
Congress defeated the Sherman Amendment primarily because it 
imposed vicarious liability on municipalities,44 nothing in the 
                                                          
adopted by the Senate. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 704-05 (1871). 
However, it did not pass in the House. Id. at 725. 
 42 The Supreme Court has analyzed the Sherman Amendment as a means 
to determine the legislative intent behind § 1983 because § 1983 was passed 
with little debate. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190 (concluding that Congress 
excluded municipal corporations from the coverage of section 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act based on the House’s rejection of the Sherman Amendment); 
Monell, 436 U.S. at 682 (overruling Monroe insofar as it held municipalities 
immune from liability under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act based on a fresh 
interpretation of the Sherman Amendment); Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 265 
(reasoning that, based on Congress’ rejection of permitting punitive damage 
awards against municipalities in the context of the Sherman Amendment, 
punitive damage awards are also forbidden under § 1983). See generally Owen 
v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (holding that municipalities 
have no immunity from damages resulting from their constitutional violations 
under § 1983). 
 43 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 459 (1871). Senator Edmunds 
stated: 
[The Fourteenth Amendment] which speaks to the protection which 
the States must afford to all their inhabitants equally under the 
law . . . does speak . . . to municipal authorities existing under State 
law directly; and when, therefore, they fail to perform the duty of 
protection, which the theory of this law implies that they are bound to 
perform . . . then the Constitution has declared that Congress, by 
appropriate legislation, may apply to them the duty of making 
reimbursement. 
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 756-57 (1871). See also Monell, 436 
U.S. at 690 (“Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other 
local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 
applies.”). 
 44 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-95 (indicating that while the proponents of 
the Sherman Amendment viewed it as only coming “into play when a locality 
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legislative history of the Amendment mitigated the duty that the 
Act imposed on local governments to protect “persons” subject to 
their coverage.45 The rejection of the Sherman Amendment, 
therefore, does not alter the municipality’s responsibility to 
protect its citizens from a denial of equal protection.46 
Furthermore, the rejection of the Amendment suggests that 
Congress, in enacting section 1 of § 1983, did not impose a 
prerequisite that the state or municipality act with the intent to 
deprive someone of a constitutional right.47 Thus, Congress’ 
major objectives in enacting § 1983 were twofold. First, it 
intended to impose an obligation on state and local governments 
to protect the already existing rights of its citizens.48 Second, it 
sought to create an affirmative duty on the states to protect its 
citizens by stating that denial of equal protection and any failures 
to proactively protect its citizens’ rights violate the Act.49 
Therefore, the legislative history of § 1983 supports the 
                                                          
was at fault or had knowingly neglected its duty to provide protection,” other 
proponents, and ultimately Congress, viewed it as a means to vicariously hold 
municipalities liable for the unlawful acts of local citizens). 
 45 Ballen, supra note 32, at 315. 
 46 See Ballen, supra note 32, at 314. There is no indication that there was 
any debate over the validity of Senator Edmund’s statement regarding 
municipal obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment when the Sherman 
Amendment was rejected. See Ballen, supra note 32, at 314. 
 47 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 755 (1871). The existence of a 
specified intent requirement, that the rioters have acted “with the intent to 
deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution” in the 
rejected Sherman Amendment, indicates Congress would have included a 
similar provision in § 1983 if it desired to do so. Id. See also Jones v. Alfred 
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-26 (1968) (supporting the proposition that 
Congress would provide a specific requirement with express language had that 
been its desire, and, therefore additional requirements should not be read into 
the Act); Eric Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. 
REV. 213, 242 (1979) (noting that the legislative history of § 1983 indicates 
that “except as to certain specific provisions, Congress attached no importance 
to the intent involved”). 
 48 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The 
Civil Rights Act of 1871 was entitled “An Act to enforce The Provisions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .” Id. 
 49 Ballen, supra note 32, at 313. 
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proposition that, when a municipality disregards a prior ruling by 
its own judicial circuit, it should be held liable. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of § 1983 
The legislative history of § 1983 suggests an overarching 
policy; statutes that are meant to protect and remedy wrongs to 
people should be liberally construed.50 Senator Edmunds stated 
the following: 
The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to, as 
defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the 
United States when they are assailed by any State law or 
under the color of any State law, and it is merely carrying 
out the principles of the civil rights bill, which has since 
become a part of the Constitution.51 
In enacting § 1983, the legislature had three main goals: to 
override any state legislation endangering the constitutional rights 
and privileges of the citizens of the United States;52 to provide a 
“remedy where state law was inadequate;”53 and “to provide a 
federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in 
theory, was not available in practice.”54 
The Supreme Court has thoroughly analyzed the legislative 
history behind the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to 
determine whether municipal liability exists under § 1983.55 This 
                                                          
 50 Monell, 436 U.S. at 684 (according to Representative Shellabarger, the 
courts would and should interpret section 1 with a broad effect). 
 51 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871). The civil rights bill 
referred to by Senator Edmunds is the Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27. This 
bill became part of the Constitution through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 52 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 174. 
 55 See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 168-92 (discussing the legislative 
history of § 1983 explicitly throughout its twenty-four page opinion); Monell, 
436 U.S. at 660-702 (conducting a renewed analysis of § 1983 leading to the 
Court’s overruling of Monroe insofar as it holds local governments wholly 
immune from suit under § 1983); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 
622, 635 (1980) (noting the necessity to conduct an analysis of the “language 
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process, however, has not been easy. In 1961, Monroe v. Pape56 
raised the question of whether the forty-second Congress 
intended to include municipalities within the ambit of § 1983.57 
The Court concluded that because the Sherman Amendment, 
which proposed municipal liability, received such an 
“antagonistic”58 response from Congress and was rejected for this 
reason,59 Congress could not have intended the word “person,”60 
as used in the Act, to include municipalities.61 Seventeen years 
                                                          
of the statute itself” to determine the scope of a municipality’s immunity from 
liability under § 1983); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 
(1981) (examining the common-law background and policy considerations of 
§ 1983); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 813 (1985) (declaring that 
“[a]lthough this Court has decided a host of cases under [§ 1983] in recent 
years, it can never hurt to embark on statutory construction” prior to deciding 
the question of whether “a single isolated incident of the use of excessive force 
by a police officer establishes an official policy or practice of a municipality 
sufficient to render the municipality liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983”); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (basing its 
opinion on the “principles underlying § 1983” to conclude that a municipality 
is equally responsible under § 1983 whether a particular course of action 
directed by those who establish governmental policy is to be undertaken only 
once or to be taken repeatedly). 
 56 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 57 Id. at 170. 
 58 Id. at 191. 
 59 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1871). Mr. Poland, speaking 
about the Sherman Amendment’s proposal to hold municipalities liable, stated: 
“We informed the conferees on the part of the Senate that the House had taken 
a stand on that subject and would not recede from it; that that section imposing 
liability upon towns and counties must go out or we should fail to agree.” Id. 
 60 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191. The Court explained that Senator 
Sherman proposed the Sherman Amendment while the Act of April 20, 1871 
was being debated in Congress. Id. at 188. While Congress was debating this 
amendment, they relied on the Act of February 25, 1871, entitled “An Act 
prescribing the Form of the enacting and resolving Clauses of Acts and 
Resolutions of Congress, and Rules for the Construction thereof” for a 
definition of the word “person.” Id. at 190. Section 2 of the Act of February 
25, 1871 provided that a permissible, but not mandatory definition of the word 
“person” “extend[ed] and [could] be applied to bodies politic and corporate.” 
Id. at 191. 
 61 Id. (concluding that “[t]he response of the Congress to the proposal to 
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later, in Monell v. Department of Social Services,62 the Supreme 
Court re-examined the legislative history behind § 1983 and 
overruled Monroe.63 The Court concluded that the Monroe Court 
misunderstood the meaning of the Act,64 thereby suggesting the 
possibility of municipal remedies for § 1983 violations.65 The 
holding of Monell, however, did not directly address this issue; 
thus, the question remained open.66 Finally, in 1981, the Court 
addressed the issue of whether municipalities could be held liable 
for punitive damages in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.67 
It held, after an analysis of the legislative history behind 
§ 1983,68 that municipalities are immune from punitive 
damages.69 
C. Fact Concerts:70 The Impenetrable Barrier to Punitive 
                                                          
make municipalities liable for certain actions being brought within federal 
purview of the Act of April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we cannot 
believe that the word ‘person’ was used in [§ 1983] to include them”). 
 62 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 63 Monell, 436 U.S. at 664-89. Monell overrules Monroe insofar as 
Monroe held that local governments are not “persons” and are immune from 
suits under § 1983. Id. 
 64 Monell, 436 U.S. at 700-01. The Court stated: 
It is simply beyond doubt that, under the 1871 Congress’ view of the 
law, were section 1983 liability unconstitutional as to local 
governments, it would have been equally unconstitutional as to state 
officers. . . . [T]here can be no doubt that section 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed, 
against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights. 
Therefore, absent a clear statement [to the contrary] there is no 
justification for excluding municipalities from the “persons” covered 
by section 1. 
Id.  
 65 Id. 
 66 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 664-89; see generally Ballen, supra note 32 
(describing the elusiveness of the Court’s decision and proposing a model of 
municipal liability). 
 67 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 
 68 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 69 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 271. 
 70 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 
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Damages 
In an action brought under § 1983, Fact Concerts, Inc., a 
musical concert promoter, sued the City of Newport, Rhode 
Island for a violation of its First Amendment rights.71 Fact 
Concerts, Inc. had obtained permission from the Rhode Island 
Department of Natural Resources to present several jazz concerts 
at a state park in Newport.72 When a regularly scheduled 
performer was unable to appear at the concert, Fact Concerts 
engaged the group Blood, Sweat and Tears as a replacement. The 
Newport City Council attempted to prevent Blood, Sweat and 
Tears from performing because it feared the band would attract a 
rowdy audience to the city.73 Although the concert went on, 
ticket sales were significantly lower due to the media attention 
covering the city council’s vote to cancel the contract.74 Fact 
Concerts, Inc., therefore, sued the city to recover lost ticket 
profits. At the conclusion of a six day trial in district court, the 
jury awarded Fact Concerts $200,000 in punitive damages 
against the city, as well as damages from the individuals 
involved.75 
The City of Newport moved for a new trial, arguing that 
§ 1983 prevents the assessment of punitive damages against a 
municipality, and in the alternative, that the award was 
excessive.76 The district court proceeded to consider the merits of 
the city’s arguments.77 It concluded, however, that municipal 
liability was appropriate under the circumstances presented.78 The 
                                                          
 71 Id. at 252 (alleging, inter alia, “that the license cancellation amounted 
to content-based censorship, and that its constitutional rights to free expression 
and due process had been violated under color of state law”). 
 72 Id. at 249-50. 
 73 Id. at 250. 
 74 Id. at 251. 
 75 Id. at 253. The rest of the punitive damages awarded, amounting to 
$75,000, was spread among the seven individual officials. Id. 
 76 Id. at 253. 
 77 Id. at 253-54. 
 78 Id. at 254. The court noted, however, that caution was warranted in this 
area because of the burden that would be imposed on the taxpayers. Id. It also 
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court of appeals, unable to find any appellate decisions that had 
barred punitive damage awards against municipalities, affirmed 
the district court’s decision.79 
The question presented to the Supreme Court on certiorari 
was whether a municipality could be held liable for punitive 
damages under § 1983.80 The Supreme Court analyzed the claim 
of municipal liability using a “two part approach.”81 First, it 
considered the legislative history relevant to § 1983 and the 
common law pertaining to municipal liability for punitive 
damages.82 Second, it evaluated the policies behind punitive 
damages and the relevancy and relation of those policies to 
§ 1983. Finally, it concluded that municipalities are immune 
from punitive damages under § 1983.83 
In assessing the legislative history, the Court compared the 
treatment of private corporations and municipalities under 
common law.84 According to the Court, in 1871 municipalities 
and private corporations were both subject to suits for tortious 
conduct and were required to pay compensatory damages if found 
                                                          
concluded that the $200,000 award of damages was excessive and it ordered a 
remittitur, reducing the punitive damages to $75,000. Id. 
 79 Fact Concerts, 626 F.2d 1060 (1980). The court noted the “distinct 
possibility that municipalities, like all other persons subject to suit under § 
1983, may be liable for punitive damages in the proper circumstance.” Id. at 
1067. 
 80 Id. at 254. 
 81 Id. at 258-59. The Court has applied this “two-part approach” since it 
decided Monell. Id. 
 82 Id. at 258-59. 
 83 Id. at 271. The Court stated: 
In sum, we find that considerations of history and policy do not 
support exposing a municipality to punitive damages for the bad-faith 
actions of its officials. Because absolute immunity from such damages 
obtained at common law and was undisturbed by the 42d Congress, 
and because that immunity is compatible with both the purposes of § 
1983 and general principles of public policy, we hold that a 
municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. 
Id. 
 84 Id. at 259-71. 
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liable.85 Courts were, and continue to be, however, disinclined to 
subject either entity to punitive damages.86 Absent a specific 
congressional provision altering the common-law scheme, 
however, the Court concluded that § 1983 similarly barred 
punitive damages.87 Furthermore, the Court looked to the 
Sherman Amendment, which only provided compensatory 
damages for injuries sustained from acts of mob violence.88 It 
reasoned that since Congress did not intend to permit punitive 
damage awards against municipalities in the Amendment, it 
would not have meant to impose them “sub silentio under § 1 of 
the Act.”89  
Additionally, the legislative history of section 190 indicated 
Congress’ concern that local governments would not be able to 
support the financial burden an assessment of punitive damages 
would impose upon them.91 Congress also indicated that punitive 
damages would unjustly punish taxpayers for actions taken by 
other persons.92 The Court concluded that the legislative history 
surrounding § 1983 and the common law of 1871 suggest that 
compensatory damages, not punitive damages, are appropriately 
awarded against a municipality when it has committed a wide 
range of tortious activity.93 
Since Congress did not intend to alter the common law 
                                                          
 85 Id. at 259. 
 86 Id. at 260 n.21. 
 87 Id. Cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (determining that if 
Congress had intended to abolish punitive damages it would have done so 
explicitly). 
 88 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 264. 
 89 Id. at 265. 
 90 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 91 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 795 (1871) (comments of 
Representative Blair) (arguing that the obligations imposed by the amendment 
might “utterly destroy the municipality”). See also Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 
265. 
 92 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 266 (citing the remarks of Senator 
Stevenson who feared that the amendment “under[took] to create a corporate 
liability for personal injury which no prudence or foresight could have 
prevented”); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 762 (1871). 
 93 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 259-61. 
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scheme when it enacted § 1983, the Court then looked to see if 
public policy considerations should override Congress’ intent.94 
The purposes underlying punitive damages are twofold: to punish 
the “tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or 
malicious, and to deter him and others from similar extreme 
conduct.”95 The Court easily dismissed the retributive goal of 
punitive damages because the tortfeasor would not be made to 
suffer from his unlawful actions96 and the innocent taxpayers 
would instead foot the bill.97  
Next, the Court examined the rationale of § 1983 in relation 
to the deterrent objective of punitive damages. It rejected 
respondent’s argument that the deterrent purpose of § 1983 
would be fulfilled by assessing “[p]unitive damages awards 
against municipalities for the malicious conduct of their 
policymaking officials [by inducing] voters to condemn official 
misconduct through the electoral process, [so that] the threat of 
such awards [would] deter future constitutional violations.”98 
Instead, the Court found it uncertain that policymaking or other 
municipal officials would be deterred if the city were to pay such 
damages.99 Superiors, the Court believed, would take corrective 
                                                          
 94 Id. at 266-70. 
 95 Id. at 266-67. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 38-55 (1983) (con-
cluding that there is no reason to depart from the common law standard of 
assessing punitive damages in a § 1983 action); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 908 (1979); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 9-10 (4th ed. 1971). 
 96 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 (emphasizing the importance of 
punishing the wrongdoer for his unlawful conduct and noting that punitive 
damages assessed against a municipality fail to serve the retributive goal 
because “[a] municipality . . . can have no malice independent of the malice of 
its officials”). 
 97 Id. (stating that punitive damages “are likely accompanied by an 
increase in taxes or a reduction of public services for the citizens footing the 
bill,” even though they did not participate in the commission of the tort). 
 98 Id. at 269. 
 99 Id. The Court has also noted that damages assessed against an 
individual are more likely to deter conduct than the threat of damages against a 
municipality. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980) (stating that 
“responsible superiors are motivated not only by concern for the public fisc 
but also by concern for the Government’s integrity”). 
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action against the offending officials even without the assessment 
of punitive damages.100 Finally, the Court expressed its concern 
that municipalities would become financially unstable if held 
liable for such damages.101 As such, it concluded that policy does 
not warrant an abandonment of municipal immunity.102 
The Court, however, left open the opportunity for an award 
of punitive damages in footnote 29 by suggesting that, perhaps in 
extreme situations, punitive damages are appropriate. This 
footnote indicates that the barrier to punitive damages may not be 
impenetrable, after all. 
II.  ANALYSIS OF FOOTNOTE 29103 
Footnote 29 of Fact Concerts reads as follows: “It is perhaps 
possible to imagine an extreme situation where the taxpayers are 
directly responsible for perpetrating an outrageous abuse of 
constitutional rights. Nothing of that kind is presented by this 
case. Moreover, such an occurrence is sufficiently unlikely that 
we need not anticipate it here.”104 The circuit courts are split in 
their interpretation of these words. Their divergent views suggest 
the need for review of the Supreme Court’s intent behind the 
footnote, and concise examples of the situations that would 
trigger liability. The First and Second Circuits, in analyzing the 
application of footnote 29, have focused on the taxpayers’ 
involvement in the unlawful action.105 In contrast, the Fifth 
                                                          
 100 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 268-69. 
 101 Id. at 270. When juries determine the size of a punitive damage award, 
they are allowed to consider the size and wealth of the municipality. Id. The 
Court expressed concern that this would lead to unpredictable and large 
punitive damage assessments. Id. These factors could strain the local treasuries 
and negatively impact innocent citizens who would be deprived of other 
services otherwise available to them. Id. at 271. 
 102 Id. at 271. 
 103 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 241 (finding that the taxpayers cannot be held 
responsible when an “unconstitutional policy has been adopted by municipal 
officials without any clear endorsement of the policy by the electorate”); 
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Circuit has focused more on the outrageousness of the 
constitutional abuse rather than the taxpayers’ responsibility for 
the incident.106 Despite conflicting methods of interpretation, 
subsequent courts have uniformly taken an inflexible approach to 
the precedent established in Fact Concerts and have declined to 
apply footnote 29 in order to create an exception to its sweeping 
holding.107 
It is argued that the Court would not have created footnote 29 
if it had not intended to create an exception to municipal 
immunity from punitive damages.108 While the circumstances in 
Fact Concerts clearly did not present an appropriate situation for 
the assessment of punitive damages against the municipality, 
other fact patterns do call for it.109 Certainly, a contractual breach 
                                                          
Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d at 2 (analyzing the reality of deterrence by the 
number of taxpayers in the Seekonk Water District compared to the number of 
taxpayers who actually participated in the crucial meeting). 
 106 Webster, 689 F.2d at 1229 (“The plight of Randy Webster, however 
reprehensible, however tragic, does not rise to the level of outrageous 
conduct. . . . [W]e believe that it would take a far more serious violation than 
that we confront to ground punitive damages against Houston.”). 
 107 See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d 236; Webster, 689 F.2d 1220; Heritage Homes, 
670 F.2d 1. It has been argued that footnote 29 is not an exception, rather it 
precludes an exception. Webster, 689 F.2d at 1231 (Goldberg, J., specially 
concurring). 
 108 Myriam E. Gilles, Symposium, In Defense of Making Government 
Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 
845, 871-75 (2001) (agreeing with Judge Calabresi’s concurring opinion in 
Ciraolo and arguing that the assessment of punitive damages against a 
municipality is necessary “to cause the municipality to internalize the full 
social costs of its unconstitutional policy or custom”). The Supreme Court, 
when referring to punitive damages imposed on a municipality, could simply 
have stated “[n]either reason nor justice suggests that such retribution should 
be visited upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers.” Fact 
Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267. However, instead of ending its analysis there, in 
footnote 29 the Court went on to hypothesize about a possible situation where 
it would be appropriate to impose punitive damages on a municipality. Id. at 
267 n.29. Thus, the mere presence of the footnote indicates that it be 
construed as an exception to municipal immunity from punitive damages. 
 109 See infra Part III.A-C (analyzing three cases where punitive damage 
awards should have been assessed against municipalities, but were denied 
based on the holding in Fact Concerts). 
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resulting in a violation of First Amendment rights is not an 
“extreme situation” where an assessment of punitive damages 
would be proper.110 Only a few taxpayers were members of the 
city council that voted for the cancellation; therefore, punitive 
damages would have likely burdened innocent taxpayers.111 
Moreover, while Fact Concerts, Inc. suffered a loss in ticket 
sales due to the adverse publicity,112 this loss could not be said to 
constitute “an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights.”113 These 
facts aside, footnote 29 should be interpreted in the spirit of 
§ 1983, as a means to deter municipalities from constitutional 
violations in cases with exceptional fact patterns.114 
The consequences of municipal immunity are detrimental to 
citizens whose constitutional rights have been violated and 
threaten to subvert the utility of § 1983 actions. An examination 
of the cases in which subsequent courts have declined to apply 
footnote 29 highlights the inequity of the holding in Fact 
Concerts to other litigants. 
III.  IMPACT OF FACT CONCERTS 
In its holding in Fact Concerts, the Court effectively barred 
                                                          
 110 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29. The fact that the Court created 
footnote 29 stating that “[i]t is perhaps possible to image an extreme situation, 
[however,] [n]othing of that kind is presented by this case,” suggests that the 
facts of Fact Concerts do not warrant punitive damages assessed against the 
municipality. Id. See generally Webster, 689 F.3d at 1231-38 (Goldberg, J., 
specially concurring). 
 111 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 250-52. 
 112 Id. at 252. The adverse publicity resulted in less than half the tickets 
for the concert being sold. Id. 
 113 Id. at 267 n.29. 
 114 Webster, 689 F.2d at 1229. The majority opinion in Webster 
interpreted Fact Concerts as allowing punitive damages to be assessed against 
a city in an outrageous case. Id. But see Webster, 689 F.2d at 1231-38 
(Goldberg. J., specially concurring) (suggesting that Fact Concerts has created 
an absolute bar to an assessment of punitive damages against a city). See also 
infra Part IV (proposing two ways for the Supreme Court to rework footnote 
29 to insure that the purpose of § 1983 is upheld). 
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punitive damages against municipalities in any future case.115 The 
result of this holding has been far reaching and has created 
situations where there is no redress for people whose 
constitutional rights have been knowingly violated. In subsequent 
cases, appellate courts have been forced, under the precedent set 
forth in Fact Concerts, to bar punitive damages assessed against 
municipalities even when the results are incongruous with the 
plain meaning of § 1983.116 
Other courts have applied the rule established in Fact 
Concerts to more inequitable factual situations than the relatively 
unoffensive conduct of the Newport officials.117 In fact, the 
                                                          
 115 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 271. See also, Webster, 689 F.2d at 1230-
31 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring). 
 116 See, e.g., Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242 (citing Fact Concerts as the 
constraining precedent for its reversal of a punitive damages award assessed 
against a municipality for a Fourth Amendment violation); Webster, 689 F.2d 
at 1229 (reversing the trial court’s verdict imposing punitive damages on the 
city based on the precedent established in Fact Concerts); Heritage Homes, 
670 F.2d at 2 (reversing the district court’s judgment awarding punitive 
damages against the Seekonk Water District in light of the Fact Concerts 
decision). 
 117 Examples of factual situations that command one’s attention are those 
found in Ciraolo, Webster, and Heritage Homes. In each of these cases, the 
city’s officials participated in clearly unconstitutional conduct by adopting a 
policy that it unquestionably knew, or should have known, would violate the 
Fourth Amendment by strip-searching all arrestees brought to the police 
station regardless of whether there was probable cause to believe they 
possessed contraband, by encouraging a policy of using “throw down” 
weapons to conceal police errors, and by taxpayers voting for the exclusion of 
a housing developer from access to water based on racist motivations. See 
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2000); Webster, 689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 
1982); Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982). Judge Goldberg, in 
Webster, noted the extreme differences in factual situations when he contrasted 
the facts in Fact Concerts (referred to below as Newport): 
In Newport the challenged activity was an ad hoc decision; here it is a 
widely followed municipal policy. In Newport there were specifically 
identifiable wrongdoers; here it is impossible to point to any person 
or persons responsible for the offending policy. In Newport the very 
nature of the wrong makes it public, whereas here the very nature of 
the wrong tends towards concealment. Finally, in Newport the 
consequence of the wrong was lost ticket sales; here it is needlessly, 
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breadth of the Fact Concerts holding has forced lower courts to 
grant immunity to municipalities in circumstances not 
contemplated by the Court.118 Based on the fact pattern before it, 
the Court rightly concluded that the City of Newport should not 
be subjected to punitive damages. When applied to cases with 
different and compelling fact patterns, however, blanket 
municipal immunity from punitive damages undermines the 
policies behind § 1983 and, thus, should lead the Court to 
overcome this presumption. 
A. Heritage Homes of Attleboro, Inc. v. Seekonk Water 
District119 
In Heritage Homes, the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied 
the imposition of punitive damages against the Seekonk Water 
District, a municipal corporation under state law, even though 
taxpayers in the district had voted in favor of excluding a housing 
developer from access to water due to his willingness to sell 
                                                          
tragically, lost life. 
Webster, 689 F.2d at 1233. 
 118 See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 241; Webster, 689 F.2d at 1229; Heritage 
Homes, 670 F.2d at 3. Ciraolo, Webster, and Heritage Homes each cited to 
Fact Concerts as the basis for reversing the lower court’s award of punitive 
damages. See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 241 (“[D]espite what might be the salutary 
effects of punitive damages in a case such as this, we are constrained by the 
Supreme Court’s holding in [Fact Concerts] to reverse the award of punitive 
damages.”); Webster, 689 F.2d at 1229 (“The plight of Randy Webster, 
however reprehensible, however tragic, does not rise to the level of 
outrageous conduct to which Justice Blackmun [in Fact Concerts] referred.”); 
Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d at 3 (finding that the court was “not only bound by 
the holding of Fact Concerts but it must also defer to its reasoning”). 
However, each of those cases noted the seeming inadequacy of applying the 
broad holding in Fact Concerts to factual situations presented before them. In 
his concurring opinion in Webster, Judge Goldberg noted that “a policy under 
which policemen are permitted literally to get away with murder by 
perpetrating a fraud in a subsequent investigation is more offensive to the 
principles of section 1983 than is a municipal breach of a contract for a 
concert site that results in lost ticket sales.” Webster, 689 F.2d at 1235. 
 119 670 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982). 
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houses to black families.120 The First Circuit had previously 
upheld the district court’s award of punitive damages but was 
compelled to reverse that aspect of its decision in light of Fact 
Concerts.121 The policy that the taxpayers in Heritage Homes had 
voted for was unquestionably unconstitutional and had followed 
“blatantly racist discussions.”122 Nonetheless, the court analyzed 
footnote 29 to the letter, focusing only on the taxpayers involved 
in the unconstitutional action.123 It reasoned that since only a 
minority of the members participated in this vote, it would not be 
fair to assess punitive damages against the municipality and to 
punish those taxpayers who did not vote for this particular 
policy.124 
                                                          
 120 Id. at 3. 
 121 648 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1981), on remand, 670 F.2d 1 (1982) 
(reversing the district court’s award of punitive damages against the Seekonk 
Water District, a municipal corporation under state law). 
 122 Id. at 2; see, e.g., Heritage Homes of Attleboro, Inc. v. Seekonk 
Water District, 498 F. Supp. 463 (D. Mass. 1980). At the Seekonk Water 
District meeting, in which a motion to include the property of Heritage Homes 
in the water district was raised, the gist of conversations between the voters 
discussing among themselves the Heritage Homes project was as follows: 
[T]he project would bring in black people from nearby East 
Providence; that Water District members would have to sell their 
houses at a loss because they didn’t want colored people in Seekonk; 
and that the subdivision must be stopped if the voters were to protect 
the value of their property. 
Id. at 465. During the floor discussion, the following occurred: 
One speaker said that he understood that the houses proposed by 
Heritage Homes would bring black people to the area. Another man 
asked where the builder was. When DesVergnes [the builder] 
understandably hesitated to identify himself the man demanded to see 
the builder who planned “to put up this low income housing in this 
town.” DesVergnes then stood up . . . he was asked by the same 
voter “What kind of shacks are you going to build in this town?” 
 Id. at 466. After the meeting, another voter (who did not recognize 
DesVergnes) said to him “if we don’t stop this thing here tonight . . . you will 
have all the niggers in town.” Id. 
 123 Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d at 2. 
 124 Id. at 4. The court stated that “[t]he actions of a small claque of voters 
would burden several thousand non-participants, many of whom presumably 
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Heritage Homes exemplifies the difficulties courts must face 
as a result of the vague nature of footnote 29. The court sought, 
but was unable to discern, how to assess taxpayer responsibility 
for an unconstitutional action.125 It commented that “[t]he exact 
number of members of the District is not crucial to our holding, 
though this might be a different case were there only 100 
members instead of several thousand.”126 The fact that only a 
small number of taxpayers were culpable troubled the court. An 
award of punitive damages would burden many taxpayers 
“unaware of the entire controversy.”127 In addition, the definition 
of a knowing and culpable taxpayer was unclear from the Fact 
Concerts decision.128 Therefore, the court lacked guidelines to 
determine when an award of punitive damages would be a 
successful deterrent.129 Since the scope of footnote 29 was poorly 
                                                          
were unaware of the entire controversy.” Id. 
 125 Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d at 2. The court struggled to determine when 
to hold a taxpayer responsible: 
If the theory is that most of the taxpayers knew that a group of voters 
intended to discriminate but wanted to disassociate themselves by 
staying away from the meeting, this raises a number of troubling 
questions. How much did they know? How serious was the threat? 
When must a citizen or taxpayer attend a meeting or remain away, 
vote or abstain, at his or her peril? 
Id. 
 126 Id. at 2 n.1. 
 127 Id. at 2 (“Absent widespread knowledgeable participation by taxpayers, 
the analogy to municipal officials seems apt: to award punitive damages 
against the Water District would not serve the purposes of punishment or 
deterrence.”). 
 128 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29. The Court simply stated that 
“where the taxpayers are directly responsible,” the assessment of punitive 
damages on a municipality would be appropriate. Id. However, it did not 
indicate a means to establish when a taxpayer is directly responsible or how 
many taxpayers would justify this measure. Significantly, the Court expressed 
its belief that such a situation is “sufficiently unlikely” to occur; thus, it did 
not have to anticipate these concerns. Id. 
 129 Due to the Court’s now obvious misjudgment of the likelihood of such 
occurrences, subsequent courts lack the necessary guidance to determine the 
boundaries of the Fact Concerts precedent. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s 
deliberate notation that punitive damages would appropriately serve to deter 
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defined in Fact Concerts, the First Circuit concluded that this 
case did not fall within the Supreme Court’s caveat.130 
Heritage Homes presents a perfect scenario in which the 
deterrent objective of punitive damages, consistent with the 
policy of § 1983, would be furthered by a finding of municipal 
liability. Instead, the court’s reversal of the award of punitive 
damages against the Seekonk Water District left the plaintiffs 
without remedy.131 This decision, moreover, did not impose any 
form of deterrence on the taxpayers who were responsible for 
depriving the housing developer of his constitutionally protected 
rights. While the court found it unlikely that a few responsible 
voters would be deterred by the threat of punitive damages, the 
purpose of § 1983, namely providing a broad federal remedy for 
a deprivation of constitutionally protected rights, was undermined 
because plaintiffs were denied both compensatory and punitive 
damages.132 In Fact Concerts, the Court stated “[it had] 
never . . . suggested that punishment is as prominent a purpose 
under the statute as are compensation and deterrence.”133 Thus, 
the complete denial of damages for a § 1983 violation under these 
facts amounted to “an extreme situation where the taxpayers are 
directly responsible for perpetrating an outrageous abuse of 
constitutional rights.”134 
                                                          
abuses of constitutional rights “where taxpayers are directly responsible for 
perpetrating an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights” has been 
undermined. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29. 
 130 Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d at 2. The court stated that “[w]ithout a 
more compelling showing, we have no doubt that the Court would reaffirm its 
reasoning that ‘neither reason nor justice suggests that . . . retribution should 
be visited upon the shoulders of blameless and unknowing taxpayers.’” Id. 
(quoting Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267). 
 131 Id. at 1. The first time the appellate court heard this case it affirmed 
the district court’s finding that Heritage Homes failed to prove compensatory 
damages. Heritage Homes, 648 F.2d 761, 761 (1st Cir. 1981). This finding 
was not challenged on writ of certiorari; therefore, on remand from the 
Supreme Court, the appellate court only addressed the award of punitive 
damages. Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d 1, 1 (1982). 
 132 Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d at 2. 
 133 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 268. 
 134 Id. at 267 n.29. 
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B. Webster v. City of Houston135 
The Fifth Circuit similarly held that footnote 29 does not 
provide an exception to the bar against punitive damages from 
municipalities under the facts of Webster.136 In that case, a § 1983 
action was brought by the parents of a seventeen-year-old boy 
who was shot and killed by the Houston police following a car 
chase, despite the fact that he was unarmed and attempting to 
surrender.137 Since the crime scene appeared suspicious because 
the boy was shot while unarmed, officers at the scene attempted 
to cover their tracks by placing a gun near the boy’s body.138 At 
trial, it was revealed that the police department had an unwritten 
policy of carrying “throw-downs,”139 guns or knives to be placed 
near suspects who had been shot in unclear circumstances.140 On 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the award of punitive damages 
assessed against the City of Houston based upon the reasoning 
that this crime was not outrageous enough to fall within the 
exception provided for in footnote 29.141 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Goldberg regretfully 
acknowledged that the court was bound by the precedent 
established in Fact Concerts.142 He was compelled to write 
separately because, if he agreed with the majority that there was 
an exception in footnote 29 for “egregious cases,” 143 this case 
would, in his opinion, surely fall within its ambit.144 Under his 
                                                          
 135 689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 136 Id. at 1229-30. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 1220-23. 
 139 Id. at 1224. 
 140 Id. at 1223. 
 141 Id. at 1229. 
 142 Webster, 689 F.2d at 1230 (Goldberg. J., specially concurring) (“It is 
with considerable grief that I write to specially concur in the result denying 
punitive damages against the City of Houston.”). 
 143 Id. at 1231. 
 144 Id. (“If there were any narrow gap around [Fact Concerts] for an 
egregious case, this one would slip through; I am aghast at the thought that 
any violation of constitutional rights more appalling, more threatening than the 
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interpretation of Fact Concerts, however, an “impenetrable 
barrier to punitive damages”145 had been erected. 
Judge Goldberg felt that the analysis the Supreme Court used 
to establish that punitive damages were inappropriate against the 
City of Newport compels a different result when applied to the 
facts of Webster.146 While the retributive purpose of punitive 
damages is not served when the economic burden of an 
unconstitutional action falls on blameless taxpayers, the deterrent 
purpose of punitive damages is fulfilled when a city is subjected 
to punitive damages as a result of certain circumstances, such as 
those in Webster.147 
Several notable differences are apparent between Webster and 
Fact Concerts. First, there is a difference between the actors. 
Individual officials were responsible for the action taken in Fact 
Concerts, while the official policy of the police department was 
to blame for the action taken in Webster.148 Second, the ability to 
sanction the offending officials plays a large role. The Court in 
Fact Concerts concluded that punitive damages were not 
necessary to deter the individual conduct of Newport’s officials;    
superiors would likely take action by sanctioning the 
misconduct.149 In contrast, the superiors of the police officers in 
Webster could not be relied upon to sanction the officers’ 
misconduct because they were implicitly responsible, by means 
of their collective inaction, to stop this unconstitutional 
departmental policy.150 While not necessary to deter individual 
misconduct, punitive damages would have been an effective 
means to deter group or municipal conduct, as was the case in 
Webster. Third, in Fact Concerts the Court believed that the 
damages should be assessed against those individuals directly 
                                                          
one that occurred here might actually exist.”). 
 145 Id. at 1231. 
 146 Id. at 1231-32. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 1233. 
 149 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 269. 
 150 Webster, 689 F.2d at 1236 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring). 
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responsible for the harm.151 When there is an unwritten policy, 
however, it is nearly impossible to single out those individuals 
who are responsible for its implementation.152 Therefore, it is 
unclear whether to punish those who acted under it, those who 
taught it, or those who knew about it and did nothing.153 
 Moreover, in Fact Concerts the Court expressed fear that an 
assessment of punitive damages would deprive citizens of other 
benefits or services because of the resulting financial burden 
placed on the municipality.154 Conversely, in a case such as 
Webster, this is exactly what Congress intended.155 Judge 
Goldberg reasoned that “[i]t is necessary that the threatened 
damages cause some deprivation for the populace so that they 
will be nudged out of their blissful ignorance, ‘and the effect will 
be most wholesome.’”156  
Finally, a police policy of using throw-downs is more 
offensive to the underlying goals in § 1983 than is a municipal 
breach of contract.157 The distinctions between the cases clearly 
demonstrate the need for punitive damages to punish and deter 
municipalities from supporting unconstitutional behavior. 
C. Ciraolo v. New York158 
Following a complaint from her neighbor,159 Debra Ciraolo 
                                                          
 151 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 270. “The Court previously has found, 
with respect to such violations, that a damages remedy recoverable against 
individuals is more effective as a deterrent than the threat of damages against a 
government employer.” Carlson v. Green, 466 U.S. 14, 21 (1980). 
 152 Webster, 689 F.2d at 1236 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring) 
(suggesting that the policy at issue in Webster could not be traced to any 
specific individuals, but instead was a function of “the outgrowth of the 
collective inaction of the entire police department”). 
 153 Id. at 1237 (addressing a problem with the Court’s suggestion in Fact 
Concerts that damages assessed directly against the offending officials are a 
better deterrent than those assessed against the municipality). 
 154 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267. 
 155 Webster, 689 F.2d at 1237 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring). 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 1235. 
 158 216 F.3d at 240. 
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was arrested for aggravated harassment in the second degree, a 
misdemeanor.160 When she was brought to Central Booking at the 
police station, two female Corrections Department employees 
subjected her to a strip and body cavity search.161 The search of 
Ciraolo was in accordance with an established New York City 
policy that required all arrestees brought to the police station to 
be “strip searched by the officer assigned to the search post.”162 
Ciraolo brought suit under § 1983 against the city, the police 
department, and the individual police officers involved in her 
arrest and search.163 The district court concluded that the city’s 
strip search policy was in contravention of the law of the 
circuit164 and charged the jury that “punitive damages could be 
awarded against the city if they found that the city had acted 
maliciously or wantonly.”165 The jury concluded that the city had 
violated Ciraolo’s rights when she was strip-searched and 
awarded her compensatory and punitive damages.166 On appeal, 
the city argued that the punitive damages award was foreclosed 
by Fact Concerts,167 which granted municipalities immunity from 
                                                          
 159 Id. at 237 (indicating that Ciraolo and her neighbor were involved in a 
legal dispute). 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. (describing the circumstances of the strip search where Ciraolo was 
“ordered to strip naked and made to bend down and cough while she was 
visually inspected”). Charges against Ciraolo were subsequently dismissed. Id. 
After this experience, however, she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress 
disorder, sought therapy and began taking antidepressants. Id. 
 162 Id. (referring to the New York City Correction Department “guidelines 
[for] the acceptance of all Police Cases for the Manhattan Court Division”). 
 163 Id. at 238. 
 164 See supra note 5 (citing to Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 
1986), where the Second Circuit held it unlawful to subject a misdemeanor 
arrestee to a strip search unless there is reasonable suspicion that the arrestee 
possesses contraband). 
 165 Id. 
 166 See supra note 6 (stating the jury’s award). 
 167 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 238. It should be noted that the city did not 
contest the district court’s holding that the strip-search policy violated the 
established law of the Circuit. Id. 
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punitive damages under § 1983.168 
Strictly interpreting footnote 29, the Second Circuit in 
Ciraolo followed the line of precedent established in Fact 
Concerts, Heritage Homes and Webster.169 The court concluded 
that the footnote would only apply in cases where there was a 
close link between the taxpayers’ actions and the adoption of an 
unconstitutional municipal policy.170 Therefore, although this case 
exhibited an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights, the bar to 
punitive damages was upheld.171 The court reasoned that while 
New York City’s conduct was unconstitutional, the taxpayers 
could not be held accountable for the police department’s 
policy.172 The denial of punitive damages in this case, however, 
is simply unjust. 
The court admitted that there would be “salutary effects of 
[assessing] punitive damages in a case such as this.”173 It has 
been argued that “punitive damages should be assessed whenever 
a tortfeasor has a significant likelihood of escaping liability.”174 
In the instant case, New York City had, or should have had, 
knowledge that its strip-search policy was unconstitutional.175 
                                                          
 168 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247. 
 169 See supra Parts I.C, III.A-B (detailing the Supreme Court’s finding in 
Fact Concerts that municipalities are immune from punitive damage liability 
under § 1983, and demonstrating the unjust results that the interpretation and 
application of Fact Concerts has had on subsequent cases). 
 170 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 241. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 241-42 (“[W]hile we emphatically deplore the 
City’s conduct in adopting a policy that this Circuit had earlier clearly held 
unconstitutional, the taxpayers cannot be held to be responsible for the policy 
under the reasoning of Newport.”). 
 173 Id. at 242. See Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Commentary, Limiting Federal 
Restrictions on State and Local Government, 33 VAL. U.L. REV. 33, 41 
(1998) (noting that “[a]wards of punitive damages could cause elected officials 
to take civil rights violations seriously, even absent large awards of 
compensatory damages”). 
 174 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 244 (citing A. Polinsky & Steven Sharvell, 
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 870, 888 
(1998)). 
 175 See supra note 5 (citing Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, a Second Circuit 
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Thus, it acted with blatant disregard of the law by subjecting 
Ciraolo to a strip search of her person.176 While Ciraolo was 
awarded minimal compensatory damages, the city effectively 
escaped liability since it was immunized from punitive 
damages.177 In addition, the Supreme Court noted that “[a] higher 
ratio” of punitive to compensatory damages “may . . . be 
justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect.”178 Thus, 
in a case such as Ciraolo, the only way to deter the municipality 
is to assess punitive damages.179 
This case should have been decided under a broader 
interpretation, following the spirit rather than the letter of 
footnote 29. The circuit court, because it confined itself to the 
wording of footnote 29, was unwilling to find taxpayers directly 
responsible for the constitutional violation.180 The court viewed 
the creation of footnote 29 as intending to further the retributive 
goal of § 1983181 and was, therefore, cautious in applying the 
footnote so as not to unfairly punish taxpayers.182 However, the 
precedent for strictly construing the statute to require an 
“immediate connection between the taxpayers’ behavior and the 
                                                          
case holding it unconstitutional to strip-search a person arrested on 
misdemeanor charges without reasonable suspicion that the arrestee possess 
contraband). 
 176 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 237-38. 
 177 See supra note 6 (illustrating the gross disparity between the 
compensatory damage award of $19,645 that Ciraolo received and the punitive 
damage award amounting to $5,000,000 that the Second Circuit invalidated). 
 178 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996). 
 179 See Gilles, supra note 108 (arguing that municipalities should 
internalize the full costs of their constitutional violations and that the 
“availability of punitive damages . . . will place unconstitutional policies and 
customs on the radar screens of responsible officials”). 
 180 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 240-42. 
 181 Id. at 240. The retributive purpose of § 1983 was not furthered in the 
case of Fact Concerts because the burden of punitive damages would have 
fallen on the taxpayers. See Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267. 
 182 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 241 (declining to apply footnote 29 because the 
court faced what it considered to be a “common situation in which an 
unconstitutional policy has been adopted by municipal officials without any 
clear endorsement of the policy by the electorate”). 
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unconstitutional municipal policy” is not firmly rooted.183 Not 
only have the circuit courts differed in the interpretation of cases 
premised on footnote 29,184 but Judge Goldberg stated that “he 
believed the Supreme Court’s holding [in Fact Concerts] swept 
too broadly, and was both unwarranted and unwise in a case like 
Randy Webster’s.”185 The similarities in the Webster and Ciraolo 
cases support the proposition that municipal immunity from 
punitive damages should be reviewed.186 The application of the 
Fact Concerts holding to these cases is contrary to the purposes 
of § 1983.187 
The Supreme Court has recognized that deterrence against 
future constitutional violations is an important purpose of 
§ 1983.188 This objective, however, is undermined when 
                                                          
 183 Id. at 240. 
 184 See Webster, 689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982); Heritage Homes, 670 
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982). While the Fifth Circuit focused on the outrageousness 
of the constitutional violation, the First Circuit held that the taxpayers 
involvement was the deciding aspect in determining whether punitive damages 
could be assessed. Webster, 689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982); Heritage Homes, 
670 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982). Furthermore, Judge Goldberg’s concurring 
opinion in Webster took a third and different perspective on footnote 29 and 
found that no exception was created. Webster, 689 F.2d at 1231 (Goldberg, J., 
specially concurring). 
 185 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 241 (citing Judge Goldberg’s concurring opinion 
in Webster, 689 F.2d at 1231-32). 
 186 Webster and Ciraolo are similar in that they both involve an 
unconstitutional police policy and a violation of Fourth Amendment rights. 
The same distinctions that Judge Goldberg drew between Webster and Fact 
Concerts may also be made as between Ciraolo and Fact Concerts. See supra 
Part III.B. 
 187 See generally Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242-50 (Calabresi, J., concurring); 
Webster, 689 F.2d at 1230-39 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring). 
 188 See Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 266-67 (stating that, by definition, 
punitive damages serve as a means to punish and deter the tortfeasor and 
others from similar conduct); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 at 
651-52 (1980) (suggesting that “[t]he knowledge that a municipality will be 
liable for all of its injurious conduct . . . should create an incentive for 
officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of their intended actions 
to err on the side of protecting citizens’ constitutional rights”). 
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municipalities are held immune from punitive damages.189 Since 
the behavior of a municipality is likely to be influenced to some 
extent when it is forced to bear the costs associated with its 
behavior, assessing punitive damages against a municipality 
would serve as an effective deterrent.190  
In Ciraolo, Judge Calabresi stated that “[p]unitive damages 
can ensure that a wrongdoer bears all the costs of its actions, and 
is thus appropriately deterred from causing harm, in those 
categories of cases in which compensatory damages alone result 
in systematic underassessment of costs, and hence in systematic 
underdeterrence.”191 Thus, when a rational actor192 determines 
whether or not to undertake an activity based on a “cost-benefit 
analysis,”193 the risk of underdeterrence is high when that actor 
reaps the advantages but does not bear the costs of its actions.194 
While compensatory damages, when promoting an accurate 
                                                          
 189 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 249 n.11 (Calabresi, J., concurring). In Amato v. 
Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311 (2d Cir. 1999), the Second Circuit 
acknowledged the importance of affixing fault on municipalities through 
punitive damages. The court stated: 
Perhaps even more important to society, however, is the ability to 
hold a municipality accountable where official policy or custom has 
resulted in the deprivation of constitutional rights. A judgment against 
a municipality not only holds that entity responsible for its actions and 
inactions, but also can encourage the municipality to reform the 
patterns and practices that led to constitutional violations, as well as 
alert the municipality and its citizenry to the issue. In short, finding 
against the officers in their individual capacities does not serve all the 
purposes of, and is not the equivalent of, a judgment against the 
municipality. 
Id. at 317-18. 
 190 See Owen, 445 U.S. at 652 n.34 (stating that “one must wonder 
whether this entire litigation would have been necessary had the [Independence 
City] Council members thought that the city might be liable for their 
misconduct”). 
 191 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
 192 Id. Judge Calabresi noted that Fact Concerts and § 1983 are premised 
on the assumption that a municipality does not always act rationally. Id. at 243 
n.1. 
 193 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 243 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
 194 Id. 
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“cost-benefit analysis,”195 can provide an adequate means of 
deterrence,196 there are other cases where the costs are not 
sufficiently represented.197 As Judge Calabresi noted, “[c]osts 
may not be sufficiently represented in compensatory damages for 
several reasons, most of which go to the fact that not all injured 
parties are in fact compensated by the responsible injurer.”198 
When only compensatory damages are assessed, an injured party 
may be unable to, or may choose not to sue.199 The consequence 
of providing municipalities with immunity from punitive 
damages, therefore, undermines the deterrence aspect underlying 
§ 1983. 
It is evident from a more thorough understanding of the 
reasons behind § 1983’s enactment that municipal immunity from 
punitive damages should be re-examined. In 1871, the Civil 
Rights Act was enacted in response to the failure of state and 
local governments to protect the constitutional rights of its 
citizens.200 Yet, today, nearly 150 years later, there are still city 
police departments freely violating the constitutionally protected 
rights of its citizens.201 This occurs even when the established law 
of the circuit states that a police department’s policy is illegal. 
Because of this complete defiance of the law, courts should 
                                                          
 195 Id. at 242 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
 196 Id. at 243 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. (“[A] victim may not realize that she has been harmed by a 
particular actor’s conduct, or may not be able to identify the person or entity 
who has injured her.”) See, e.g., Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 243-44 (Calabresi, J., 
concurring) (noting that the lack of compensation is reflected in an evaluation 
of the “time, effort, and stress associated with bringing a lawsuit,” as 
compared with “the compensation she can expect to receive”); Polinsky & 
Sharvell, supra note 174, at 888 (explaining that someone may not bring a suit 
“if the costs and value of the time and effort he would have to devote to the 
suit exceed the expected gain” or if the likelihood of establishing causation is 
low). 
 200 See supra notes 28, 33 and accompanying text (explaining the 
circumstances that compelled Congress to enact § 1983). 
 201 See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 236. 
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interpret footnote 29 less strictly than they have to date.202 The 
legislative history suggests that § 1983 should be broadly 
construed.203 Yet footnote 29 has been narrowly read,204 thus 
limiting the application of a meaningful remedy for a § 1983 
violation.205 
While the Court has feared that municipalities will be unable 
to financially sustain the burden of punitive damages, such a risk 
to their “financial integrity” would only be prevalent when 
“government employees and agents regularly engage in serious 
violations of civil rights.”206 A municipality facing the prospect 
of punitive damages would take the civil rights of its citizens 
more seriously.207 
Furthermore, the distinction the Court draws between the 
ability of municipal officials and municipalities to handle an  
assessment of punitive damages is weakened by state statutes on 
indemnity.208 Since municipal officials in their individual 
                                                          
 202 See Michael Wells, Punitive Damages for Constitutional Torts, 56 LA. 
L. REV. 841, 852 (1996) (arguing for a flexible interpretation of statutes to 
conform to the current society’s issues). 
 203 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (referring to comments by 
legislators describing their intent in enacting § 1983). 
 204 See supra Part III (analyzing the three cases where the courts declined 
to find footnote 29 applicable and, thus, denied or reversed the award of 
punitive damages against municipalities). 
 205 Society will benefit from municipalities being subject to a punitive 
damages remedy. Punitive damages provide a meaningful remedy when the 
plaintiff would otherwise not bring a § 1983 action. See supra note 199 and 
accompanying text. They also insure that municipalities act to protect, not 
violate, our constitutional rights. See Gilles, supra note 108; see generally 
Wells, supra note 202 (arguing that punitive damages assessed against a 
municipality are necessary to deter constitutional violations and that 
compensatory damages “ignore or undervalue the nonmonetary nature of most 
constitutional rights”). 
 206 Bodensteiner, supra note 173, at 41 (arguing that there should be a 
serious risk to the “financial integrity of a municipal entity that tolerates 
and/or encourages official lawlessness”). 
 207 Id. (suggesting that the threat of punitive damages to be paid by the 
municipality would cause elected officials to act more responsibly and consider 
the civil rights of citizens). 
 208 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 249 n.11 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
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capacities are not insulated from punitive damage liability, the 
city is essentially footing the bill for punitive damages when it 
indemnifies its employees.209 Therefore, if it is permissible for 
municipalities to pay punitive damages for purposes of 
indemnification, they should not be immune from paying punitive 
damages for their own liability.210 
The denial of punitive damages against New York City 
cannot be justified under the “two part approach” the Court 
relied on in Fact Concerts.211 First, the legislative history 
pertaining to § 1983 and the common law of municipal liability 
are severely undermined by New York City’s policy of 
indemnifying its municipal officials.212 The concern that punitive 
damages would financially burden local governments loses 
considerable strength in light of this practice.213 Moreover, the 
taxpayers ultimately end up footing the bill, despite the Court’s 
concern that they should only pay when “directly responsible” 
for the abuse of constitutional rights.214 
Second, the policies underlying both § 1983 and punitive 
damages are clearly unfulfilled by the result in Ciraolo.215 The 
city not only escaped punishment under this holding, but was also 
                                                          
 209 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 30, 41, 51 (holding that where a defendant 
has acted recklessly or with callous disregard for the plaintiff’s rights, punitive 
damages can be obtained). 
 210 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 249 n.11 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
 211 453 U.S. at 259, 266. The “two part approach” refers to the Court’s 
examination of the common-law background of § 1983 and then its public 
policy considerations. 
 212 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 249 n.11 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
 213 Indemnity is defined as: 
Reimbursement or compensation for loss, damage, or liability in tort; 
esp., the right of a party who is secondarily liable to recover from the 
party who is primarily liable for reimbursement of expenditures paid 
to a third party for injuries resulting from a violation of a common-
law duty. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 772 (17th ed. 1999). 
 214 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29. 
 215 See supra Parts I.A, III.C (discussing the policies behind § 1983 and 
punitive damages and analyzing them in relation to the court’s holding in 
Ciraolo). 
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undeterred from behaving in an unconstitutional manner in the 
future.216 It is inconceivable that the police department’s actions, 
which clearly violated the constitutional rights of its citizens, and 
disregarded the established law in the circuit, have gone 
unpunished.217 Deterrence should be of foremost importance 
when an established policy in a municipal department violates the 
constitutional rights of its citizens.218 The lack of action taken 
against the city indicates that the court implicitly accepts the 
police department’s behavior.219 Section 1983 was enacted to 
prevent unconstitutional actions taken “under the color of law,”220 
where citizens are denied their rights and not protected by their 
city.221 The legislative history of § 1983 unquestionably 
admonishes the behavior of the police department in Ciraolo and 
compels an assessment of punitive damages on the city. Unless 
the Supreme Court revisits footnote 29, future municipal policy-
makers will not be deterred from violating the established laws of 
their judicial circuits in these situations. 
                                                          
 216 See Schnapper, supra note 47 at 245 (stating that “[a]ny construction of 
section 1983 which significantly reduces the likelihood that a city will be held 
responsible in damages for municipal policies will tend to frustrate [the 
deterrence] purpose of section 1983”). See generally Wells, supra note 202 
(arguing that in order to promote deterrence of constitutional violations, the 
Supreme Court should lift the restrictions it placed on the availability of 
punitive damages under Fact Concerts). 
 217 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242-50 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (arguing that 
the result the majority reached in this case is incongruous with the purposes 
underlying § 1983). 
 218  Id. at 242, 250 (noting that the Court in Fact Concerts and Owen 
recognized that the purpose of § 1983 is to deter against future constitutional 
violations, and concluding that “the prospect of damages awarded pursuant to 
the statute manifestly fails to deter a municipality from adopting a policy that 
it clearly knows or should know violates the Fourth Amendment”). 
 219 Granting a municipality immunity from punitive damages, in the face 
of a clear violation of § 1983, contradicts the reason for which it was enacted. 
See supra Part I.A. 
 220 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). “In cases under § 1983, ‘under color’ of law 
has consistently been treated as the same thing as the ‘state action’ required 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.” United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 
n.7 (1966). 
 221 See supra Part I.A (discussing the legislative history behind § 1983). 
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IV. PROPOSAL TO MODIFY FOOTNOTE 29 
The Supreme Court’s failure to provide a test or an adequate 
means of assessing when municipal action should be subject to 
punitive damages under footnote 29 has led to the protection of 
municipal policies and behaviors that are clearly unconstitutional. 
Moreover, the Act was specifically designed to protect against 
municipal conduct of this sort. The Court stated in footnote 29 
that not only did the facts of the case not present an “extreme 
situation,” but also that “such an occurrence [was] sufficiently 
unlikely that we need not anticipate it here.”222 The unfortunate 
reality is that such extreme situations have occurred. Ciraolo and 
Webster presented the perfect scenarios to which the exception 
should have been applied.223 The Supreme Court should modify 
footnote 29 in light of the split in the circuits regarding its 
applicability and the painfully written concurring opinions of two 
well-respected judges.224 
One way the Supreme Court could modify footnote 29, so as 
                                                          
 222 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29. 
 223 See Ciraolo, 216 F.2d at 242-60 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Webster, 
689 F.2d 1230-39 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring). 
 224 See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 250 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring); 
Webster, 689 F.2d at 1230-31 (Calabresi, J., concurring). Judge Goldberg 
wrote: 
It is with considerable grief that I write to specifically concur in the 
result denying punitive damages against the City of Houston . . . I am 
aghast at the thought that any violation of constitutional rights more 
appalling, more threatening than the one that occurred here might 
actually exist [it is] with troubled human conscience [that] I concur in 
this unfortunate result. 
Id. at 1230-31. Judge Calabresi also wrote separately, concurring with the 
result in Ciraolo: 
I respectfully suggest that the purpose of § 1983, to protect federal 
constitutional rights against infringement by state actors, is not served 
when—as in the case before us—the prospect of damages awarded 
pursuant to the statute manifestly fails to deter a municipality from 
adopting a policy that it clearly knows or should know violates the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 250. 
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to further the policies of § 1983, is to impose punitive damages 
on a municipality when it has utterly disregarded a prior ruling 
by its own judicial circuit or by the United States Supreme 
Court.225 This proposed standard is consistent with the legislative 
history and the policies underlying § 1983.226 In Monell, the 
Supreme Court declined to hold local governments responsible 
under a strict liability theory since Congress rejected the Sherman 
Amendment.227 The Court, however, left undefined the scope of a 
municipality’s duty of protection under § 1983. While not 
directed at municipal liability, the amendment228 adopted in place 
of the Sherman Amendment suggests Congress’ intent pertaining 
to the duty of protection.229 It sets forth three guidelines for 
municipal liability: 1) knowledge or notice of a potential 
constitutional violation; 2) neglect or refusal to act when in 
power to do so; and 3) failure to exercise reasonable diligence to 
prevent the harm.230 Application of these three factors to the 
proposed modification of footnote 29 indicates that a municipality 
should clearly be held liable when it disregards the established 
law.231 First, a municipality that violates a prior ruling applicable 
to it has the requisite knowledge that its actions are 
                                                          
 225 This proposal does not require the Supreme Court to overrule Fact 
Concerts or any other case it has decided. Simply stated, it calls for applying 
footnote 29 to comport with the framers’ intent when they created § 1983. See 
supra Part I.A (discussing the legislative history behind § 1983). Clearly the 
Court foresaw a necessity to create an exception to its sweeping holding in 
Fact Concerts, otherwise it would have been unnecessary to have created the 
footnote in the first place. See Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29. 
 226 See supra Part I.A (providing an overview of the legislative history of 
§ 1983). 
 227 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. at 694. The Court stated that 
“a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for any injury inflicted 
solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a 
government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as 
an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. 
 228 Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 6, 17 Stat. 13. 
 229 Ballen, supra note 32, at 318. 
 230 Ballen, supra note 32, at 318. 
 231 Ballen, supra note 32, at 318. 
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unconstitutional.232 Second, that municipality possesses fault for 
its actions by refusing or neglecting to prevent the constitutional 
violation when it was capable of doing so.233 Third, the 
municipality fails to “exercise reasonable diligence”234 in 
preventing the constitutional violation. Moreover, the only way 
to fulfill the deterrent rationale of § 1983, when the municipality 
has disregarded a prior judicial ruling, is with punitive damages. 
It is not feasible that a municipality would be deterred by an 
injunction or contempt sanction because it is unlikely that the 
individual bringing the suit would be subject to the same conduct 
in the future.235 Moreover, these remedies are applicable only to 
the plaintiff seeking them and would fail to prevent other 
individuals from being subjected to identical constitutional 
violations.236 Thus, the legislative history and policies underlying 
§ 1983 support the proposition that the only way to deter a 
municipality that knowingly disregards a prior ruling by its own 
                                                          
 232 In Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), the Supreme 
Court held that, apart from decisions that clearly break from precedent, 
municipalities are responsible for anticipating developments in the law. See 
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 185 (1990) 
(analyzing Owen to determine whether a decision should be applied 
retroactively). Considering that the Supreme Court upheld the imposition of 
retroactive liability on a municipality for violating subsequent developments in 
the law, it is fair to hold a municipality liable for actions it takes in knowing 
violation of the law. Id. (stating that the determination in Owen “makes 
municipalities, like private individuals, responsible for anticipating 
developments in the law”). 
 233 See supra note 232. 
 234 See supra note 232. 
 235 Judge Calabresi noted that the doctrine of standing would prevent a 
§ 1983 plaintiff from seeking an injunction because of the difficulty in 
establishing the likelihood of being subjected to the same constitutional 
violation in the future. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 248. See also Los Angeles v. 
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983) (denying an injunction against police 
chokeholds because the plaintiff had only been injured once by such conduct, 
and thus lacked standing). It should also be noted that class action lawsuits 
only have a limited deterrent impact on unconstitutional municipal conduct. 
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 248. Therefore, they should not be relied upon to combat 
underdeterrence. Id. 
 236 See supra note 235 (discussing the effect of standing). 
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judicial circuit or by the Supreme Court is by imposing punitive 
damages.237 
The Court’s premise for denying punitive damages as a 
remedy in actions brought against municipalities is flawed.238 The 
Court expressed concern about the fact that the burden of 
punitive damages would fall on the innocent taxpayers.239 
However, the Court’s contention is premised “on an assumption 
that the municipality and the taxpayers who compose it are 
wholly distinct entities—an assumption that, as courts have 
recognized in the case of corporations, cannot withstand close 
scrutiny.”240 Thus, a municipality, like a corporation, will be 
deterred by punitive damages because the taxpayers will likely 
express their displeasure with its actions, as shareholders would, 
and cause the city to comply with constitutional standards.241 To 
ensure that the legislative aims and policies encompassing § 1983 
will be upheld, it is time the Court reconsiders footnote 29. 
                                                          
 237 See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 250 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (urging that 
deterrence is necessary to uphold the purpose of § 1983 where a municipality 
adopts a policy “that it clearly knows or should know violates the Fourth 
Amendment”). 
 238 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 268-69 (expressing concern that municipal 
officials would not be deterred by the potential imposition of punitive damages 
that would be footed by the taxpayers). 
 239 Id. at 267 (“Neither reason nor justice suggests that such retribution 
[such as an increase in taxes or a reduction of public services] should be 
visited upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers.”). 
 240 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 249 (Calebresi, J., concurring). 
Thus, in Fischer v. Johns-Manville, 103 N.J. 643, 512 A.2d 466 
(1986), the New Jersey Supreme Court, upholding an award of 
punitive damages against an asbestos manufacturer, rejected 
defendant’s argument that punitive damages “unfairly punish[ed] 
innocent shareholders” and declined its invitation to draw a 
distinction between a corporation and its shareholders, pointing out 
that shareholders have the power to affect corporate action. 
Id. at 476 (quoting Justice Blackmun) (emphasis in original). 
 241 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 249 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (noting that the 
threat that taxpayers will be unhappy when they have to pay more and get less 
in return directly impacts the political considerations of a city such as the 
power to tax and to stay in office). 
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Further modification of footnote 29, in accordance with the 
purposes of § 1983, should include an exceptionally egregious 
standard. The Fifth Circuit has suggested that conduct rising to 
an “outrageous” level would warrant the imposition of punitive 
damages on municipalities under footnote 29.242 Without a 
standard with which to measure the conduct, however, the court 
in Webster declined to fit the facts within the footnote’s 
exception.243 Deterrence of official misconduct is a primary 
purpose of § 1983;244 therefore, the Supreme Court should define 
egregious official conduct and modify footnote 29 to include that 
standard as an exception to municipal immunity from punitive 
damages. The Court determined that it was appropriate to apply 
the “shocks the conscience”245 test to uphold an individual’s right 
to due process protection from arbitrary governmental actions.246 
Similarly, § 1983 serves to prevent individuals from being 
subjected to official action taken “under the color of law.”247 
Thus, it would be appropriate to apply the “shocks the 
conscience” test as a means to evaluate the exceptionally 
egregious standard. 
The foundation for applying the “shocks the conscience” test 
has been established in several Supreme Court decisions.248 This 
                                                          
 242 Webster, 689 F.2d at 1229-30. 
 243 Id. 
 244 See supra Part I.A-B (examining the deterrent effect that § 1983 is 
intended to invoke). 
 245 The Supreme Court first applied this test in Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (reversing the conviction of the petitioner based on the 
conduct of the police officers in securing the conviction, which was found to 
“shock the conscience” and thus offend the Due Process Clause). 
 246 See Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (holding that the 
“shocks the conscience” test was applicable to determine whether a high-speed 
police chase, resulting in the death of the plaintiff, was a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process). 
 247 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 
 248 See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 833; Rochin, 342 U.S. at 165. But cf. 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1977) (rejecting the “shocks the 
conscience” test and instead adopting an objective test to protect those rights 
that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition . . . and implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty”). 
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test should be used as a starting point to assess whether the 
official conduct in question warrants municipal immunity from 
punitive damages.249 To determine whether official action has 
reached a “shocking” level, the Court has emphasized that 
attention be given to the time and opportunity the official had to 
deliberate prior to taking action.250 Situations of high pressure, in 
which an immediate decision is required, raise the threshold of 
shocking conduct.251 Incorporating an exceptionally egregious 
standard into footnote 29 would provide a means for courts to 
determine which fact patterns demand punitive damages, thereby 
fulfilling the purpose of § 1983. As Judge Goldberg noted, 
“social costs of the gravest nature” result when we protect the 
police department, which instead of protecting us from violence, 
inflicts violence upon us.252 He further stated, “[i]t is only by 
threat of punitive damages that we can be sure policymakers will 
be cognizant of this grave social cost.”253 Footnote 29 is dictum 
and, therefore, should not be interpreted inflexibly so as to 
unconditionally immunize municipalities from punitive damages. 
Exoneration of official misconduct undermines § 1983. To 
remedy this, footnote 29 should be modified to include the 
                                                          
 249 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850. Note that the “shocks the conscience” test is 
used as a means to assist the Court in determining whether there was a 
violation of due process, rather than as a hard and fast rule. Id. at 847. Justice 
Kennedy pointed out that the “shocks the conscience” test is highly subjective, 
and that the Court should objectively determine whether the conduct is 
consistent with the accepted and required action in question. Id. at 857 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 250 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853. The Court acknowledged that certain positions 
or situations afford officials more time than others to think before they act: 
When such extended opportunities to do better are teamed with 
protracted failure even to care, indifference is truly shocking. But 
when unforseen circumstances demand an officer’s instant judgment, 
even precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to harmful 
purpose to spark the shock that implicates “the large concerns of the 
governors and the governed.” 
Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). 
 251 Id. at 854. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. 
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exceptionally egregious standard as described above. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The bar to the assessment of punitive damages on 
municipalities found liable of unconstitutional conduct should be 
reconsidered by the Supreme Court. Modification of footnote 29, 
so that it comports with the policies and purposes of § 1983, 
would not require the Court to overrule Fact Concerts,254 but 
should set out a standard with which to apply it. Municipal 
immunity from punitive damages presents an obstacle in certain 
cases to the realization of the objectives of § 1983. The Supreme 
Court has stated that, while there is a higher threshold for review 
in the area of statutory interpretation as compared to 
constitutional interpretation,255 a precedent becomes more 
vulnerable when it “has been found to be inconsistent with the 
sense of justice or with the social welfare.”256 Today, municipal 
immunity from punitive damages in certain § 1983 actions has 
resulted in outcomes that can be classified as unjust and contrary 
to social welfare.257 In Heritage Homes, the municipality’s 
immunity from punitive damages not only left the plaintiffs 
without a remedy, but also left the perpetrators of the 
                                                          
 254 Therefore, considerations of stare decisis do not present a problem for 
the Court. When faced with the question, for example, of whether to overrule 
the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, adopted by the Court in Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), Justice Kennedy stated that overruling a 
statutory interpretation requires a “special justification” because of the 
considerations of stare decisis. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 
164 (1989). 
 255 See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172-73. Justice Kennedy stated that 
“considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory 
interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, 
the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we 
have done.” Id. 
 256 Runyon, 427 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting B. 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921)). 
 257 See, e.g., Ciraolo, 216 F.3d 236; Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d 1; 
Webster, 689 F.2d 1220. 
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unconstitutional action undeterred.258 The injustice created by 
municipal immunity from punitive damages is further exemplified 
by the exoneration of the unconstitutional police department 
policy of using “throw downs” in Webster.259 The result in 
Webster directly contradicts the purpose of § 1983 because it 
effectively condones the police department’s policy of violating 
the constitutional rights of its citizens. 
Finally, footnote 29 compels modification when applied to the 
facts of Ciraolo.260 At the very least, a municipality should be 
liable for punitive damages when it knowingly violates not only 
the law established in its judicial circuit, but also the Federal 
Constitution. If there is no action taken to punish cities when they 
breach the law, then the law itself and the values it promotes are 
severely undermined. Compensatory damages are not enough to 
deter municipalities from violating § 1983. In accordance with 
applying a broad construction of § 1983, footnote 29 should, 
therefore, be modified. Only then will the courts fully realize the 
purpose and spirit of the statute and once again provide remedies 
to those who are deprived of their constitutional rights.  
 
                                                          
 258 See Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d 1. As noted by the Supreme Court in 
Fact Concerts, prevention of future misconduct is a fundamental objective of 
punitive damages, and the underlying goal of § 1983 is to deter future abuses 
of power. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 268. Thus, the denial of punitive 
damages in Heritage Homes is counterproductive. 
 259 See 689 F.2d at 1230-38 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring). 
 260 See supra Part III.C (analyzing the Second Circuit’s interpretation of 
footnote 29 and explaining the unjust result the court reached). 
